Chicago Journal of International Law
Volume 21

Number 1

Article 5

6-1-2020

The Children of ISIS: Statelessness and Eligibility for Asylum
under International Law
Ana Luquerna

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Luquerna, Ana (2020) "The Children of ISIS: Statelessness and Eligibility for Asylum under International
Law," Chicago Journal of International Law: Vol. 21: No. 1, Article 5.
Available at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol21/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Chicago Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please
contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

The Children of ISIS: Statelessness and Eligibility for
Asylum under International Law
Ana Luquerna

Abstract
This Comment focuses on the thousands of foreign children who are indefinitely detained
at al-Hol camp in Northern Syria due to their perceived affiliation with ISIS. Specifically, this
Comment explores whether stateless children who lived under the ISIS regime and cannot
repatriate are eligible for asylum under international law, including the 1951 Convention on the
Status of Refugees and its accompanying 1967 Protocol. After examining the relevant
international law protecting children and the stateless, this Comment finds that the detention of
children at al-Hol camp violates the laws of war and international human rights law. Specifically,
the squalid conditions of the camp do not advance the children’s best interest, which every country
in the world except the U.S. has committed to uphold through the Convention on the Rights of
the Child. Western countries’ refusal to repatriate prevents their citizens from exercising their
right to nationality and their right to return to their home country. Thus, the children become de
facto stateless when countries refuse to take them back. Taking into consideration the constant
violations of international law present at al-Hol camp, this Comment argues that the foreign
children at al-Hol camp meet the requirements for refugee status because they are being persecuted
as a particular social group (defined as “children who lived in the ISIS regime and who do not
have the ability to be repatriated to their home country”). They are persecuted by, first, their home
countries, which refuse to repatriate them and, second, the Syrian government and Kurdish
administration.
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I. I NTRODUCTION
On March 23, 2019, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) lost its last
territorial stronghold at the Battle of Baghuz Fawqani, leading the Syrian
Democratic Forces to officially declare final victory over the terrorist
organization.1 Even though no official ISIS territory remains, it is estimated that
there are still tens of thousands of ISIS followers in Syria and Iraq.2 ISIS’s “defeat”
has led to the incarceration of over 11,000 male fighters.3 Additionally, former
refugee camps in Syria, Iraq, and Libya have been converted into detention camps
for thousands of women and children who were previously affiliated with ISIS.4
The fall of ISIS has raised legal, political, and ethical questions about “what to do
with the tens of thousands of people who had flocked to join the jihadists from
around the world and now have nowhere else to go.”5
The territorial victory over ISIS has led to a dire humanitarian crisis in the
detention camps housing the thousands of women and children previously
affiliated with ISIS. Al-Hol camp is the largest of three detention camps located
in northern Syria and is run by the autonomous Kurdish administration.6 Though
it is challenging to gather the exact number of detainees in the camp, as of January
2020, there are an estimated 63,000 women and children in detention at al-Hol
camp.7 Around 9,000 of the detainees are non-Iraqi and non-Syrian foreigners.8
41,000 of the camp’s residents are children under eighteen, of whom 7,000 are
foreign.9 Of all the children in the camp, ninety-five percent are under the age of
twelve.10 Foreigners in the camp include people from about fifty countries,
1

2

3

4

5
6
7

8

9
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Rukmini Callimachi, ISIS Caliphate Crumbles as Last Village in Syria Falls, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2019),
http://perma.cc/X6RV-5HBN.
Eric Schmitt, Alissa Rubin, and Thomas Gibbons-Neff, ISIS is Regaining Strength in Iraq and Syria,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2019), http://perma.cc/N75B-WT6N.
Ben Hubbard, Charlie Savage, Eric Schmitt, & Patrick Kingsley, Abandoned by U.S. in Syria, Kurds
Find New Ally in American Foe, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2019), http://perma.cc/4JR7-68EU.
Ben Hubbard, In a Crowded Syria Tent Camp, the Women and Children of ISIS Wait in Limbo, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 29, 2019), http://perma.cc/5975-NSY5.
Id.
Id.
Eric Rosand, B. Heidi Ellis & Stevan Weine, Minding the Gap: How to Provide More Comprehensive
Support to the Children of ISIS, BROOKINGS (Jan. 28, 2020), http://perma.cc/5298-5EPF.
Id.; see also U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Syrian Arab Republic, North
East Syria: Al Hol Camp (Jan. 15, 2020), http://perma.cc/UU6A-AHQV [hereinafter Syrian Arab
Republic].
Rosand et al., supra note 7; International Rescue Committee, IRC Data Reveals Staggering Child
Mortality in Al Hol Camp, RELIEFWEB (Sep. 16, 2019), http://perma.cc/WRA7-6CQD.
Liz Sly, New Suffering for the Children of the ISIS Caliphate as Hunger and Sickness Spread, WASH. POST
(June 19, 2019), http://perma.cc/ZMS4-HT25.
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including, among others, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands,
Trinidad, Algeria, and Russia.11 The Kurdish administration has stated that it has
no intention to prosecute the detainees, and it has repeatedly emphasized that
home countries should repatriate their citizens.12 Al-Hol camp has made
international headlines due to the lack of humanitarian assistance available to its
detainees. Women and children are severely malnourished and have limited access
to basic resources.13
Some detainees at al-Hol camp have been involved in ISIS-related activities.
While there are not any publicly available data with exact numbers, many women
in the camp are avid ISIS followers, and some of the children were trained by
jihadists.14 However, not all the women and children were directly involved with
ISIS. Some women were coerced to marry ISIS fighters against their will, and
many children had no choice but to follow their parents who chose to join the
group.15 Nevertheless, the radicalization of some women and the stigmatization
of the children as terrorists have made repatriation and the delivery of
humanitarian aid difficult.16
Various solutions have been proposed to address the humanitarian crisis at
al-Hol camp, including local or Iraqi prosecution,17 citizenship stripping,18 and
repatriation.19 Repatriation would help end this humanitarian crisis for foreigners
at al-Hol camp because countries would take their citizens back to their respective
home countries instead of leaving them at the camps. However, repatriation
numbers have been low.20 The reluctance to repatriate citizens leaves foreigners

11

12

13
14
15

16

17

18
19
20

Syria: Dire Conditions for ISIS Suspects’ Families, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 23, 2019),
http://perma.cc/Y5GM-JVWR [hereinafter Dire Conditions for ISIS Suspects’ Families].
Turkey-Syria Border: Trump Threatens to “Obliterate” Turkish Economy, BBC NEWS (Oct. 8, 2019),
http://perma.cc/LT2G-MTCS; Dire Conditions for ISIS Suspects’ Families, supra note 11.
Dire Conditions for ISIS Suspects’ Families, supra note 11.
Hubbard, supra note 4.
Louisa Loveluck & Souad Mekhennet, At a Sprawling Tent Camp in Syria, ISIS Women Impose a Brutal
Rule, WASH. POST (Sep. 3, 2019), http://perma.cc/JCX4-X9MT.
Jessica Trisko Darden, The Al-Hol Case: Left-Behind ISIS Adherents Pose a Unique Challenge, REALCLEAR
WORLD (July 30, 2019), http://perma.cc/9LW6-8RZD (explaining that many countries have laws
that prevent the delivery of financial or humanitarian support to individuals linked to terrorist
organizations).
In local or Iraqi prosecutions, the government of Syria or Iraq would be prosecuting the women
and children who are currently detained at camps and who are allegedly affiliated with ISIS.
Dire Conditions for ISIS Suspects’ Families, supra note 11.
Hubbard, supra note 4.
Id.
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in these detention camps effectively stateless.21 Consequently, thousands of
foreign women and children have nowhere to go, while the Kurdish
administration detains them indefinitely. Countries’ refusals to take back their
citizens make it difficult to see an end to the detention centers like al-Hol camp.
This Comment focuses on the foreign children, meaning children who are
not Syrian or Iraqi,22 in al-Hol camp and proposes an alternate solution to their
detention. Foreign children are of special significance because they have the
option to repatriate to their home country, unlike the Iraqi and Syrian children in
these detention camps. Because al-Hol camp has received the most international
coverage of the camps, this Comment discusses the conditions there. However,
the solutions discussed and proposed in this Comment are not inherently limited
to al-Hol camp and apply to the other detention camps that house women and
children who lived under the ISIS regime. This Comment does not propose
implementing a new law. Rather, it proposes a new understanding of the current
doctrine. Specifically, the main question addressed in this Comment is whether
stateless children, assuming they cannot be charged with a terrorist-related crime,23
who lived under the ISIS regime and are unable to repatriate are eligible for asylum
under relevant international law, such as the 1951 Convention on the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.24 This Comment’s conclusions would thus be
applicable in any country that has ratified either document. Being eligible for
asylum would be an alternate way for children to gain residency in a foreign
country and to end foreign child detention in these camps.
This Comment focuses on children because of a long-standing international
norm of commitment to protecting children’s rights. The United Nations (U.N.)
has given children a special status and protection framework, deeming them a

21

22

23

24

Article 1(1) of the 1954 Convention to the Status of Stateless Persons defines a stateless person as
“a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law.” People
may be born stateless, but people may also become stateless due to various causes including the
deprivation of nationality. CHILDREN WITHOUT A STATE: A GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS CHALLENGE
3, 83 (Jacqueline Bhabha ed., 2011).
Even though Iraqi children are technically foreigners in Syria, Iraqi children are not included in the
scope of this Comment because ISIS was not only present in Syria but also in significant portions
of Iraq. This Comment focuses on the children that come from countries where ISIS did not project
territorial authority.
This qualification is included because, in some circumstances, children who meet certain criteria
that demonstrates their direct involvement with a terrorist organization may be disqualified from
refugee status. For the disqualification to apply to children, he/she must have reached the age of
criminal responsibility, which is determined by each country, and it must be established that he/she
had the mental capacity to commit the crimes. More of this will be discussed under Section IV.B.5.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refuges, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter 1951
Refugee Convention]; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Oct. 4, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267
[hereinafter 1967 Refugee Protocol].
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particularly vulnerable group treated with special concern.25 The Convention on
the Rights of the Child (CRC), which has 196 parties to it, is the most
comprehensive treaty addressing heightened duties toward children.26 Not only is
the CRC the most widely ratified human rights treaty, but there are over twenty
additional treaties that specifically address special protection for children.27 As a
whole, these treaties demonstrate states’ uniform agreement that children are a
unique and vulnerable population that merit special protection.
Children’s rights are different than other areas covered by international law.
In fact, the rights of children are “among the most elaborated within
contemporary international law,”28 making violations against children by state and
non-state actors “particularly grave.”29 If children continue to be held at al-Hol
camp against their will, and without a way to return to their home countries, the
international community will stand idly by as international law—specifically the
CRC—is openly violated. These violations would demonstrate an important
deficiency in the international community’s ability to exercise its power.
This Comment advances as follows: Section II describes al-Hol camp, its
detainees, the conditions at the camp, and home countries’ responses to this
situation. Section III discusses relevant international law addressing children,
detention, statelessness, and the right to return. Section IV, primarily focusing on
the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 protocol, argues that the foreign
“children of ISIS”30 are eligible for asylum under international law when their
home countries refuse to repatriate them. Specifically, this Comment argues that
these children meet the requirements for asylum because they are being persecuted
as a particular social group (“children who lived in the ISIS regime and who do
not have the ability to be repatriated to their home country”). The persecution is
carried out by first, their home countries who refuse to repatriate them, and
second, the Syrian government and the Kurdish administration. This means that
asylum eligibility occurs not only when a home country strips children’s
citizenship but when a home country actively decides to block the return of its
children. This Comment distinguishes itself from the existing literature on
displaced children and refugee law because it focuses on the children of ISIS, who
25

26
27
28
29
30

Children’s Rights, INT’L JUST. RESOURCE CTR., http://perma.cc/FLF3-9W99 [hereinafter “Children’s
Rights”].
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Sept. 2, 1990, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC].
Id.
CHILDREN WITHOUT A STATE, supra note 21, at 62.
Children’s Rights, supra note 25.
In this Comment, “children of ISIS” is defined as anyone detained under eighteen years of age in
the following categories: 1) children who were born abroad but were brought by their parents into
the ISIS regime; 2) children who were born into the ISIS regime and who have foreign-born parents;
3) children who were involuntarily trafficked or forced to be part of ISIS; and 4) children who
travelled voluntarily (without parents) to the ISIS regime.
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may have been involved in radicalization and who have very little chance to return
to their countries. This Comment concludes by addressing the family separation
critique implied by the premise of the paper.

II. T HE A L -H OL C AMP H UMANITARIAN C RISIS
This Section describes the detainees at al-Hol camp, which include
thousands of women and children who were previously living under the ISIS
regime. It continues by discussing the camp’s appalling conditions, including the
lack of international aid and organizational presence. This Section ends by
addressing previously proposed solutions to the situation at al-Hol camp. These
solutions include repatriation, prosecution of the detainees at the camp, and
citizenship stripping. This Section demonstrates that al-Hol camp represents a
great humanitarian crisis whose detainees are being overlooked by the
international community due to their association with ISIS.

A. The Detainees
After the fall of ISIS in March 2019, al-Hol camp became a detention center
for women and children affiliated with ISIS. The population at al-Hol camp was
approximately 9,000 people in December 2018 but rose to over 70,000 people by
March 2019, overwhelming local camp administration officials and creating an
urgent need of humanitarian supplies and assistance.31 As of January 2020, there
are an estimated 63,000 women and children at al-Hol camp.32 Around 9,000 are
non-Iraqi and non-Syrian women and children who are housed in a foreigners’
annex.33 Detainees in the foreigners’ annex come from about fifty countries and
currently have no legal immigration status.34
The detainees are not allowed to freely leave al-Hol camp because of their
perceived dangerousness. Many of the women are considered national security
threats because “some [women] were . . . combatant[s] . . . [and] still endorse the
extremists’ ideology, making local officials reluctant to let them leave.”35 The
women in al-Hol camp had various reasons for joining or being a part of ISIS.

31
32
33
34
35

Hubbard, supra note 4.
Syrian Arab Republic, supra note 8.
Id.
Hubbard, supra note 4.
Id.
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Some joined voluntarily, while others were coerced.36 Experts state that “some
[women are] both victims and perpetrators.”37
While many of the women may suffer as much as the children in the camp,
this Comment specifically focuses on the foreign children at al-Hol camp. Al-Hol
camp’s “[c]hildren make up about two-thirds of [a]l[-]Hol’s residents. Some are
orphans. . . . All ha[ve] witnessed violence, and some ha[ve] been taught to
practice it.”38 Furthermore, “[t]he Islamic State, researchers say, employed
children as scouts, spies, cooks and bomb-planters, and sometimes as fighters and
suicide bombers.”39 Some of the children “have had years of ISIS indoctrination
and, in the case of older boys, military training.”40 However, not every child was
involved in terrorist-related activities. A majority of the children had no choice
but to live under ISIS, and many were even born into the regime. In total “20,000
residents are under the age of 5,” and “11,000 of the kids aged 6 to 18 have not
been exposed to learning for at least five years.”41 Several hundred of the children
are orphans as well.42 The specific number of children who are suspected of
involvement in terrorist-related crimes at al-Hol camp is not publicly available,
nor is there evidence that this information has been recorded. However, the U.N.
suggests that limits in children’s knowledge, options, and cognitive development
support that these children are primarily victims and in need of special attention.43
Even with the lack of specific data concerning children detained at al-Hol
camp,44 the foreign children more than likely fall into one of four categories: 1)
36

37
38
39
40
41

42
43

44

Vivian Yee, Thousands of ISIS Children Suffer in Camps as Countries Grapple With Their Fate, N.Y. TIMES
(May 8, 2019), http://perma.cc/HF2R-4MJ2 [hereinafter Thousands of ISIS Children Suffer].
Id.
Hubbard, supra note 4.
Yee, Thousands of ISIS Children Suffer, supra note 36.
Id.
Robin Wright, The Kids of the Islamic State, FOREIGN POL’Y (June 3, 2019), http://perma.cc/3WRLTK9M.
Sly, supra note 10.
U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, HANDBOOK ON CHILDREN RECRUITED AND EXPLOITED BY
TERRORIST AND VIOLENT EXTREMIST GROUPS: THE ROLE OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 75 (2017).
Data regarding the children at al-Hol camp specifically does not exist at the moment. However,
estimates do exist for foreign children involved in ISIS as a whole. A study attempting to trace the
number of foreign children who joined ISIS describes that “at least 4,640 foreign minors have been
accounted for within IS in Iraq and Syria.” Additionally, the top five contributing countries include
France (with an estimated 460-700 children), Morocco (391 children), Kazakhstan (390), Tajikistan
(293), and Germany (290). However, there are discrepancies in these numbers because collected
data does not differentiate between minors actively engaged in ISIS and those who were occupied
by ISIS. These numbers include children from any of the four groups mentioned above, thus the
numbers do not separate those coerced or forced into ISIS and those who joined on their own.
Joana Cook & Gina Vale, From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’: Tracing the Women and Minors of Islamic State, INT’L
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children who were born abroad but were brought by their parents into the ISIS
regime; 2) children who were born into the ISIS regime and who have foreignborn parents; 3) children who were involuntarily trafficked or forced to be part of
ISIS; and 4) children who travelled voluntarily (without parents) to the ISIS
regime.45 The first three groups describe children that lacked agency when
becoming part of ISIS. The fourth group, however, describes children that were,
presumably, not forced or coerced to join. This Comment will demonstrate that
refugee designation may be available to any child in the aforementioned groups.
Those in the fourth group are at the highest risk of being denied refugee status.
However, as discussed in Section II.F, foreign fighters may gain refugee status
under certain conditions.
This Comment solely focuses on the child detainees in the foreigners’ annex
because foreigners are technically entitled to citizenship and residence in countries
other than Syria and Iraq. The local Kurdish administration is demanding that
Western states repatriate their citizens, arguing that each foreign detainee is the
responsibility of his or her own country. However, apart from each country’s
reluctance to repatriate its citizens, determining the nationality of the women and
children can be challenging due to many of the detainees’ lack of identification
and the use of fake identities.46

B. Conditions in the Camp
At al-Hol camp, there is a shortage of medicine, food, clean water, and
sanitary conditions.47 Because of the population surge in 2019, the camp is
overcrowded, especially the foreigners’ annex, whose conditions are worse than
the camp’s main area housing Syrians and Iraqis.48 Those in the foreigner’s annex
experience worse treatment than other detainees in the camp.49 Unlike the Syrian
and Iraqi detainees, foreign women and children have more limited mobility, a
lack of access to direct medical services, and a lack of sustenance.50 Foreigners are
not allowed to have cell phones, and they are not allowed to make purchases with

45
46
47
48

49
50

CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF RADICALIZATION, KING’S COLLEGE LONDON DEPARTMENT OF WAR
STUDIES 28–29 (2018).
See generally id.
Hubbard, supra note 4.
Yee, Thousands of ISIS Children Suffer, supra note 36.
Vivian Yee, Guns, Filth and ISIS: Syrian Camp Is ‘Disaster in the Making’, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2019),
http://perma.cc/3E5A-9MP3.
Dire Conditions for ISIS Suspects’ Families, supra note 11.
Id.
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the camp’s internal currency.51 There have also been reports that women have had
to give births in their tents, illustrating how little care is given to detainees.52
Many children have already died due to sickness and malnutrition. So far,
over 390 child deaths have been reported en route to al-Hol camp or in the camp
due to preventable diseases and lack of food.53 Currently, there is a cemetery
outside the camp with bricks and little mud mounds marking the graves for the
children who have lost their lives.54
Radicalization experts worry that camps like al-Hol will become breeding
grounds for terrorism and warn of the danger of leaving children, already
vulnerable, in conditions where they may be exposed to extremist ideologies.55
There is evidence that al-Hol camp does house ISIS followers,56 which means that
radical ideology is something to which children may be exposed, especially due to
the lack of alternative education in the camp. Because “[t]here are no schools in
the camp, and the children remain vulnerable to the teachings of their surviving
parents or guardians, who were among the staunchest holdouts of the Islamic
State,”57 the camps are counterproductive to fighting ISIS indoctrination.
Additionally, unjust punishment has been a common rallying cry for extremist
organizations in the past, and consequently, this camp could spark another
insurgency movement.58 Many academics and radicalization experts cite lessons
from Camp Bucca, the detention center where ISIS’s leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi
was schooled.59 They are of the opinion that unless a “secure and humane
resolution to the issue of those thousands displaced by the collapse of the IS
caliphate” is found, then the detention camps are “ticking time bombs that
Europe and other parts of the world will live to regret.”60 There is fear that if
detainees are not taken back by their countries, the women may be radicalized
51
52

53

54
55

56
57
58
59

60

Id.
Jane Arraf, Misery Grows at Syrian Camp Holding ISIS Family Members, NPR (May 23, 2019),
http://perma.cc/V7C7-RMZA.
Nick Cumming-Bruce, Horrid Conditions in Syria Camp Where ISIS Families Fled Risk Fostering
Extremism, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2019), http://perma.cc/2AJQ-R3YQ.
Sly, supra note 10.
Frank Gardner, Islamic State Group: Europe Has Ticking Time Bomb in Prison Camps, BBC NEWS (Oct.
26, 2019), http://perma.cc/JET3-3PYT.
Dire Conditions for ISIS Suspects’ Families, supra note 11.
Sly, supra note 10.
Gardner, supra note 55.
See, for example, Andrew Gilmour, The Children of ISIS Don’t Belong in Cages, Either, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
9, 2019), http://perma.cc/EV97-7AC4; Aaron Zelin & Wilayat al-Hawl, “Remaining” and Incubating
the Next Islamic State Generation, WASH. INST. FOR NEAR E. POL’Y (2019), http://perma.cc/3QK2D9BE.
Gardner, supra note 55.
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further or even absorbed into what remains of ISIS, taking their children along
with them.

C. International Aid and Organizations
The stigma attached to detainees prevents countries and individuals from
sufficiently supporting the humanitarian efforts in the camp. Many international
donors have been reluctant to help the detainees because they fear that this will
be seen as helping terrorist organizations. Often, “[t]heir excuse is that these are
‘terrorist families’ and they say, as humanitarian NGOs, they don’t support
terrorists.”61 Numerous countries also have laws that criminalize financial support
to individuals linked with terrorist organizations.62 Additionally, there are fears
that the Assad government will weaponize humanitarian assistance, as it has done
so in the past.63 The Assad regime has been known to actively block the delivery
of aid to territories held by his opposition. In early 2019, the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was allegedly temporarily blocked from
delivering aid to al-Hol camp due to a dispute with the Assad regime.64 Because
of the aid hold-up, many residents lacked shelter for various weeks.65 The regime
“may exploit the increasingly dire conditions in al-Hol camp to pressure the
Kurdish forces …to hand over control.”66 The lack of humanitarian assistance
exacerbates the suffering of the children al-Hol camp.

D. Repatriation Efforts
The women and children at al-Hol camp are unable to leave the camp
because the majority of countries where they come from have refused to take
them back. The refusal to repatriate is driven by home countries’ fear of importing
extremism. However, some governments have been willing to repatriate citizens.
For example, as of October 2019, Kazakhstan took back 156 of its children.67

61
62
63

64
65
66

67

Id.
Darden, supra note 16.
Rigging the System: Government Policies Co-Opt Aid and Reconstruction Funding in Syria, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (June 28, 2019), http://perma.cc/8WAH-J92N.
Id.
Id.
Darden, supra note 16. See also Jasmine Perry, The Weaponization of Humanitarian Aid in Syria, REV. OF
INT’L CONFLICT AND SECURITY (Oct. 27, 2019); Press Release, Security Council, Mandate Renewal
for Cross-Border Assistance Mechanism Critical to Help Millions of Syrian Civilians, Top Official
Tells Security Council, U.N. Press Release SC/14020 (Nov. 14, 2019).
A Tiny Proportion of Foreign Children in North East Syria Camps Repatriated in 2019, SAVE THE CHILDREN
(Oct. 16, 2019), http://perma.cc/5FZD-L8N4 [hereinafter Children Repatriated in 2019].
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Kosovo repatriated seventy-four children.68 The total number of children
repatriated from the three main camps holding ISIS women and children in
northeast Syria remains low, however, and is around 350 total.69 Considering there
are still over 7,000 foreign children in the camps, repatriation efforts have been
lagging and “piecemeal.”70
Most other countries refuse to take children back due to logistical difficulties
such as security threats and the complications of nationality certifications. For
example, some children have been born to parents with different nationalities,
making it hard to determine which nationality the child should claim, especially if
one parent has died in battle.71 Overall, “few [countries] seem ready to send people
to Syria and Iraq to collect them. Several countries require children born in the
[ISIS regime] to undergo DNA testing to prove their parentage, and therefore
their citizenship, before repatriation.”72 Due to the lack of resources in the camp,
DNA testing for determining citizenship makes it extremely challenging for
children to be able to return to their country of citizenship.
Western states have received the most criticism for their failure to undertake
repatriation efforts. France has repatriated seventeen children, yet there are an
estimated 200 French children in the detention camps.73 Belgium repatriated six
children.74 Germany repatriated twelve,75 and Sweden brought home seven.76
Norway has repatriated five orphans, yet left thirty-five children behind.77 The
Netherlands repatriated two,78 but there are an estimated ninety Dutch children in
Syria and Iraq.79 Additionally, as of October 20, 2019, Save the Children reported
that thirty unaccompanied British children remained in the camps.80 Lastly, the
68
69
70
71

72
73

74
75

76
77
78
79

80

Id.
Id.
Dire Conditions for ISIS Suspects’ Families, supra note 11.
Letta Tayler, Western Europe Must Repatriate Its ISIS Fighters and Families, AL JAZEERA (June 21, 2019),
http://perma.cc/HQ6L-VJEH.
Yee, Thousands of ISIS Children Suffer, supra note 36.
Children Repatriated in 2019, supra note 67; Families Sue French Foreign Minister Over Children Stuck in
Syria, FRANCE24 (Sept. 16, 2019), http://perma.cc/J3X4-ZNPT.
Children Repatriated in 2019, supra note 67.
Repatriate or Reject: What Countries Are Doing with IS Group Families, FRANCE24 (June 11, 2019),
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U.S. has repatriated sixteen Americans, both adults and children.81 The U.S.,
however, is one of the countries with the smallest number of citizens who joined
ISIS.82 Because only around 300 Americans joined ISIS abroad, “few if any of the
children [at al-Hol camp] appear to be U.S. citizens.”83
Moreover, after the U.S. forces’ withdrawal from the Kurdish region in Syria
in 2019, Turkey’s subsequent encroachment into Syrian territory has added an
obstacle to home governments’ involvement in repatriating their citizens.84 For
example, the Australian government explained that it is too dangerous for their
officials to go into Syria to take children back now that Turkey was increasing its
presence in the area.85 Even though al-Hol camp is not located in a combat area,
al-Hol camp has been negatively affected by Turkey’s actions. Since the invasion
in October 2019, the Kurdish forces have prioritized fending off the invasion
rather than monitoring their detention camps.86 Additionally, most international
groups have suspended their activities in the camp, making the humanitarian
situation more dire than before.87 Lastly, escapes have been confirmed at a
detention center near al-Hol.88 Overall, the fighting at the border has increased
danger to children in the camp, highlighting the need for repatriation or other
action by the international community. The need for more people to fight at the
Syria–Turkey border may decrease security at the camps, leading to an insurrection
by detainees or more escapes. There are no reported plans for the repatriation of
children in case the Kurds leave the camps as they go fight Turkish forces at the
border.89
Legal arguments have recently arisen challenging various governments’
choice to not repatriate their citizens. Detainees and their families from Germany,
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France, Belgium, Australia, and the Netherlands have challenged their detention
in their respective courts.90 In Belgium, a Brussels court ordered the government
to bring back ten children from al-Hol camp within six weeks.91 5,000 euros will
be fined per child per day if the government does not comply.92 However, an
appeals court in the Hague ruled that the Netherlands is not required to take back
approximately ninety children from ISIS. 93 France has rejected the appeals of
cases that claimed a right to repatriation.94 The French Council of State denied
communal repatriation and stated that decisions would have to be decided on a
case-by-case basis.95 In Germany, an appeals court in Berlin required the German
government to repatriate a woman and her three children due to the “lifethreatening” conditions in the camp.96 Furthermore, while Australia has
repatriated eight children so far, Australia has proposed laws preventing the return
of children as young as fourteen years old for two years if they are suspected of
terrorism.97 It is unclear whether governments will cooperate with rulings that
force them to repatriate their detainees. However, while the decision whether to
cooperate is made by governments, detainees remain in a legal limbo and
indefinite detention.

E. Local Prosecution
As an alternative to repatriation, states may choose to leave their citizens in
al-Hol camp with the hope that they will face local prosecution, meaning
prosecution in either Syria or Iraq. Presumably, if people at al-Hol camp were
successfully, and fairly, prosecuted, they would either be imprisoned or released
from detention, and the camps would therefore no longer be necessary. In the
90
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eyes of some countries, local prosecution is a better option than prosecution in a
detainee’s country of citizenship (“prosecution at home”) because local authorities
have greater access to evidence and witnesses, and local prosecutions allow the
country to avoid the costs associated with those prosecutions. France has taken
this route with respect to eleven adult male citizens, who were all sentenced to
death for their involvement with ISIS after a hasty trial in Iraq.98 Stark criticism of
the decision to pursue local prosecution followed because for terrorism cases,
Iraqi law does not convict based on a defendant’s actions (“the underlying
crime”).99 Rather, Iraqi law convicts people simply because they joined ISIS.100
Critics of Iraqi prosecution claim that Iraqi law contemplates terms of punishment
too broadly. Forty-five French defense lawyers criticized the French government’s
decision to support local trials because “it violated the [French] constitution by
risking the execution of its citizens and . . . [by] using the threat of terrorism to
justify an overall erosion of protections for suspects and detainees.”101
So far, Iraqi trials102 have attracted criticism because they also violate Iraqi
law. Iraqi trials have been found to be rushed, based on coerced confessions, and
without victim participation.103 No significant efforts have been undertaken to
gather evidence for prosecution.104 Additionally, authorities have violated the due
process rights of ISIS suspects under Iraqi law, which provides the ability to see a
judge within twenty-four hours of detention, to have access to lawyers during
interrogations, and to notify their families that they are being detained.105
Regarding the prosecution of allegedly ISIS-affiliated women, judges have rejected
claims of foreign women who have testified that their husbands forced them to
come to Syria without giving them any choice.106 These observations demonstrate
that Iraq has not upheld its own judicial protections for terrorist-related suspects,
98
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making it unlikely that it will uphold any international standards107 that provide
protection for detainees in al-Hol camp.
Flaws in the Iraqi trials also raise questions about the general ideal of, and
international right to, a fair trial. For example, children not yet detained at al-Hol
camp have been subjected to arbitrary arrests and prosecutions, with torture being
utilized as a way to coerce confessions.108 Apart from utilizing torture, “the lack
of transparency . . . , the use of the death penalty, limited to no access to defen[s]e
counsel . . . , [and] the collapse of a functioning judiciary . . . in Syria [and Iraq] all
indicate that foreign fighters and their families do not receive a fair trial, if they
receive a trial at all.”109 The U.N. Human Rights Committee has stated that the
right to a fair trial “may never be made subject to measures of derogation that
would circumvent the protection of non-derogable rights.”110 It further states that
“[d]eviating from fundamental principles of fair trial, including the presumption
of innocence, is prohibited at all times.”111 So far, Iraq, a signatory to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), is violating this
treaty112 by hastily conducting local trials that do not ensure fair trials for detainees.
Moreover, even if local prosecutions offered an opportunity for foreign
detainees to clear their names, this opportunity may not be available to the women
and children held in al-Hol camp. First, there is a lack of probative evidence
indicating that many of the women and children were not involved with ISIS, and
this evidence would require significant resources to find. Second, because the Iraqi
government is seeking millions of dollars to prosecute male fighters, far more
107

108

109

110

111
112
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resources would be necessary to expand the prosecution of women and children
as well.113 Third, the prisons in Syria are already overwhelmed with male militants
who may face trial. It is unlikely that the prosecution of women and children will
take priority over this imprisoned population. Lastly, the Kurdish administration
has stated that they are not going to prosecute the women and children in the
detention camps.114 The focus of prosecution is placed on the men who are being
held in actual prisons. The women and children at al-Hol camp are being held
indefinitely without access to court proceedings that determine guilt or innocence,
in violation of international law.115 Thus, local prosecution is unlikely to be an
adequate solution for the children at al-Hol camp.

F. Prosecution at Home
Prosecution at home is available to countries under the nationality doctrine
of prescriptive jurisdiction.116 This is a proposed solution to detention camps
because presumably, detention camps would not be necessary if each country took
back their citizens and placed them in prosecution proceedings at home. However,
there are major logistical challenges associated with prosecution at home. First,
prosecution at home has been deeply criticized because in most countries in
Europe, sentences for those convicted of being part of terrorist organizations only
consist of a few years in jail.117 In Belgium and Germany, the average sentence is
five years, and in the U.K. the average is seven.118 France stands out for having
longer sentences, around fourteen to twenty years of imprisonment.119 The short
sentences cause fear amongst people at home that regard this prosecution as a
quick way for terrorists to be free from real punishment, making it an unpopular
solution. Additionally, there is fear that evidence would be hard to find in
battlefields, thus making prosecution, in Iraq or in the home country, even more
challenging.120 States may also have admissibility rules regarding evidence that also
prevents it from being used in court. For example, the U.K. does not allow
intercepted evidence in court, and Germany does not allow social media posts to
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be admitted as evidence.121 If people are taken back to home countries without
enough evidence for prosecution, there will likely be political backlash against the
home government, which would be seen as bringing in national security risks.122
Also, even if convicted, imprisonment may pose a “potential difficulty” because
“prisons are often an incubator of radicali[z]ation.”123 Because home prosecutions
will be difficult and may be distrusted, countries seem unwilling to trust that this
process will provide meaningful redress when women and children are brought
home. Thus, prosecution at home is also not an adequate solution to children’s
needs at al-Hol camp.

G. Stripping of Citizenship
Some countries have encouraged stripping citizenship from the detainees at
al-Hol camp. The U.K. has stripped the citizenship of various nationals,124 and
Denmark has proposed stripping citizenship from children born abroad to Danish
jihadists.125 Between 2018 and 2019, those stripped of citizenship by the U.K.
increased by 600 percent, but the U.K.’s Home Office refused to identify how
many of these people were related to ISIS.126 Critics of the practice of stripping
citizenship state that this practice leaves people “homeless without protection,”
making international cooperation challenging because other countries have to take
on the costs of detaining, housing, or prosecuting the stateless.127 Overall,
stripping of citizenship is often criticized as an inefficient, counterproductive, and
even dangerous way to fight terrorism because it eliminates the possibility of
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persons back, including the political cost of conveying an unpopular message,
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rehabilitation, reintegration, and prosecution in the country of citizenship.128 As
of this writing, there are no documented instances of children being stripped of
citizenship so, for the purpose of this Comment, this solution will be regarded as
an extreme action. Nonetheless, the fact that governments might take this action
against children in the future raises the risk of leaving children without a
nationality.

III. R ELEVANT L AW
This Section will discuss the international legal frameworks that address
children’s rights, detention, stateless people’s rights, and the right to return. A
discussion of the relevant law will demonstrate how the detention of the children
of ISIS in al-Hol camp and other similar camps is in violation of international law,
including major international human rights treaties.

A. Children under International Law
The CRC is the most comprehensive treaty providing protection for children
worldwide, with 196 states party to it. Under the treaty, a child is defined as any
person who is under the age of eighteen.129 The Convention130 is organized by four
principles: (1) the principle of non-discrimination,131 (2) the principle of the best
interest of the child,132 (3) the right to life, survival, and development,133 and (4)
the right to be heard.134 Additionally, the Convention guarantees various
fundamental rights including but not limited to the right to protection from abuse,
exploitation, and neglect, the right to education, and the right to adequate food
and health.135

128

129
130

131
132
133
134
135

Lizzie Dearden, Shamima Begum: Government Was Warned Three Years Ago that Stripping People of
Citizenship Could Increase Terror Risk, Official Documents Reveal, THE INDEPENDENT (Feb. 23, 2019),
http://perma.cc/MKK6-JSVS; see also Naomi Wayne et al., Shamima Begum Citizenship Decision Sets a
Dangerous Precedent, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 21, 2019), http://perma.cc/B569-RCKT.
CRC, supra note 26, at art. 1.
Four Principles of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, UNICEF (June 24, 2019),
http://perma.cc/2GYL-333G.
CRC, supra note 26, at art. 2.
Id. at art. 3.
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The principle of the best interest of the child is the cornerstone of children’s
rights in international law.136 According to Article 3, “[i]n all actions concerning
children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions,
courts of law, administrative authorities[,] or legislative bodies, the best interest of
the child shall be a primary consideration.”137 This is applicable to all children no
matter whether they live in their country of origin or not. The Committee on the
Rights of the Child138 has explained that this principle is a substantive right, a legal
principle, and a rule of procedure.139
The CRC also addresses situations of children in armed conflict, especially
those used in combat zones. Articles 39 and 40 describe states’ commitment to
promote the recovery and social reintegration of child victims in armed conflict.140
Recovery and reintegration “shall take place in an environment which fosters the
health, self-respect[,] and dignity of the child.”141 Additionally, regarding the
prosecution of children involved in armed conflict, every child is entitled to a
presumption of innocence until being proven guilty, to have “the matter
determined without delay by a competent, independent,” and impartial authority
in a fair manner, to have his privacy respected, and more.142
The foreign children at al-Hol camp are a vulnerable population not only
because they are children but also because they are perceived as ISIS affiliates.
Some were born into ISIS, some joined on their own, and some were introduced
to ISIS by their parents. No matter the reason, due to their age, the U.N. has
emphasized that “the recruitment and exploitation of children by terrorist and
violent extremist groups [is] to be considered a serious form of violence against
children.”143 Consequently, children recruited by extremists or those born into the
group should be treated as victims under international law.144 The CRC, along with
136
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Counter-Terrorism Strategy Review (July 1, 2016).
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U.N. guidelines, emphasizes that at least up until some age (most often eighteen
years old under the CRC, “unless under the law applicable to the child, majority
is attained earlier”),145 children are often understood not to be able to exercise
meaningful choice, even if they claim to act on their own.146 Overall, the labeling
of the children of ISIS as terrorists puts them at a high risk of being ostracized by
their communities.147 In fact, the children are already victims due to the
international community’s refusal to remove them from the appalling detention
camps.
The U.N. takes the position that recognizing children that participated in
armed conflict as victims rather than combatants is justified. Doing so provides
children with critical access to the rights of victims of crime.148 Thus, the legal
status of victim grants them access to specific rights, like the right to reparations
and rehabilitation.149 Additionally, this recognition aids the process of
reintegration.150 Being considered a victim rather than a terrorist would
fundamentally shift how the world views these children, and hopefully, how the
world reacts to their current plight. Additionally, the U.N. has emphasized that
“there should be a presumption against the prosecution of children, and they
should be treated primarily as victims.”151 Even for children accused of crimes
145

146

147
148
149
150
151

CRC, supra note 26, at art. 1 (“A child means every human being below the age of eighteen years
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under international law imply that this child cannot or should not be prosecuted for his or her
actions? The U.N. Office on Drugs and Crimes negates this claim.
[T]he imperative of treating a child recruited by a terrorist or violent extremist
group ‘primarily as a victim’ does not mean that the child should be granted
immunity for criminal acts committed during his or her association with the
terrorist or violent extremist group. Instead, the notion of primary victimization
should be duly recognized, integrated[,] and considered at the different stages
of the justice process. This means that children should be awarded the
safeguards and guarantees of child victims, concerning safety, safeguards and
appropriate assistance, including reparations. It also means that prosecution
should always be regarded as a measure of last resort and, whenever a child is
alleged to have committed a criminal offence, the rights and safeguards provided
by the international legal framework for child offenders should be fully
respected and applied.
U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIMES, supra note 43, at 75–76
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related to terrorist organizations, the prioritization of non-judicial measures,
rehabilitation, and reintegration is necessary in order to prioritize children’s best
interest.152
The four main rights guaranteed to children worldwide by the CRC are being
denied to the children of ISIS as of 2020. Regarding non-discrimination, the
foreign children of ISIS are being discriminated against when compared to the
Iraqi and Syrian children, who have more access to resources in al-Hol camp.153
The right to survival and development is being disregarded with over 390 child
deaths due to preventable causes.154 The right to be heard is also ignored because
these children, so far, have had minimal success in appealing their detentions.155
Lastly, detention in a squalid camp without education and an increased chance of
radicalization cannot be regarded as in the best interest of any child.156 Even going
beyond the four main rights guaranteed by the CRC, camps like al-Hol violate a
child’s rights to protection from abuse, exploitation, and neglect, the right to
education, and the right to adequate food and health.
Two other specific issues regarding the children in al-Hol camp merit
discussion: child-sensitive age assessment and cross-border cases.157 Because of
the Syrian civil war, birth certificates and other forms of identification for children
are scarce.158 Thus, it is difficult to judge whether teenagers are under the age of
eighteen. The presence of armed conflict and lack of documentation may lead
more states to try children as adults rather than presuming they are under eighteen
and trying them as minors.159 However, the U.N. recommends that serious effort
should be taken to determine the age of children, while respecting the dignity of
those children.160 Additionally, in cases where there is no conclusive determination
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Id.
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by a judge, public officials “must treat the young person as a child if he or she
claims to or appears to be younger than eighteen.”161
As for cross-border cases, U.N. discussions focus on the possible extradition
of children to their home countries, as long as the principle of non-refoulement
is respected. 162 This is not a possibility for the children in al-Hol camp because
their home countries refuse to take them back. Overall, however, under the CRC,
States have the responsibility to protect the rights of children within their territory
without discrimination, no matter whether children are their own citizens or
not.163 Furthermore, “[t]he obligation to promote social reintegration continues to
apply when public authorities enter into contact with children who are not
nationals of their countries, including if they have crossed a national border
following their recruitment by a terrorist or violent extremist group.”164 None of
these efforts are being made by Syria or Iraq today. The rehabilitation and the
reintegration of children who have been exploited should be the overall goal of
administrative detention, rather than punitive reasons of prosecution.165
Even when children have been involved in terrorist-related activities,
because of their age, lack of agency, and vulnerability as a group, the international
community has uniformly agreed by signing the CRC that treating children as
victims of exploitation by terrorist organizations is in the best interest of
children.166 This discussion on the international protection for children’s rights
makes it clear that the detention of the children of ISIS, the current detention
conditions, and the lack of return possibilities all violate the CRC.

B. The Legal Basis of Detention
The international legal basis for detention falls under international human
rights law during peacetime and the law of armed conflict (international
humanitarian law) under wartime. During peacetime, international human rights
law allows detention when it is “necessary to protect national security, public
order, public health or morals, or the rights and freedoms of others.”167 According
to the U.N. Human Rights Committee, “[t]he right to liberty of person is not
161
162

163
164
165
166

167

Id.
Id. at 130 (“The non-refoulement principle entails that States shall not extradite, expel or otherwise
remove a person to another State where that person faces a real risk of persecution, including
substantial risk of torture or other irreparable harm.”).
CRC, supra note 26, at art. 2.
U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 43, at 130.
See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 151; S.C. Res. 2427, supra note 151.
See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 151; see also S.C. Res 2427, supra note 151; S.C. Res. 2396,
supra note 151; S.C. Res 2178, supra note 151.
Dire Conditions for ISIS Suspects’ Families, supra note 11.
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absolute” and deprivation of liberty is sometimes justified as long as it is not
arbitrary and is carried out “with respect for the rule of law.”168 Thus, detention
should only be imposed “according to law, on an individual basis, and with all
basic rights of the detained under international law including judicial review of
detention.”169 The Kurdish administration can claim that the detention of women
and children is a lawful preventive detention because the detainees are a national
security threat. However, according to the U.N. Human Rights Committee,
“[e]gregious examples of arbitrary detention [which is forbidden under the
ICCPR]170 include detaining family members of an alleged criminal who are not
themselves accused of any wrongdoing.”171 Thus, under international human
rights law—specifically the ICCPR—the detention of children at al-Hol camp
violates international law.
During wartime, the law of armed conflict—which allows states to detain
those “reasonably suspected of threatening state security, without affording them
judicial guarantees”—applies.172 Even though the War on Terror is technically not
an international armed conflict under the definition of the 1949 Geneva
Convention, it can and has been used as a basis for creating detention centers
where the international law of armed conflict applies.173 The law of armed conflict
“permit[s] states to detain anyone reasonably suspected of posing a security threat
until the circumstance justifying detention cease[s] to exist, or until the end of
hostilities.”174 Because the foreign women and children are at al-Hol camp due to
their perceived connection to ISIS, the Kurdish administration can claim that
under the international law of armed conflict, the detention is lawful until
hostilities with ISIS fully come to an end. However, the U.N. Human Rights
Committee has explained that in situations where the law of armed conflict
applies, international human rights law acts as a complement to it.175 While no case
has clearly delineated the relationship between the two bodies of law, it is clear
that international armed conflict law cannot openly disregard the requirements
168
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U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 35 on Article 9 (Liberty and Security of the
Person), U.N. Doc. CCPR/G/GC/35, ¶ 10 (2014).
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See ICCPR, supra note 107, at art. 9.
U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 168, at ¶ 16.
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Id. at 370–71.
Id. at 379–80; see Third Geneva Convention, supra note 107, at arts. 21, 118 (allowing detention of
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found under major international human rights treaties, which includes the
ICCPR.176 Thus, even if international armed conflict law is used to rationalize alHol camp, national security concerns do not invalidate ICCPR guarantees.
Regarding the children specifically, their detention due to security concerns
has unfortunately become the “norm rather than the exception.”177 At various
times in history, the presumption that some children are a risk for society has led
to child detention all over the world, including Thailand, Iraq, Nepal, Sri Lanka,
and the U.S.178 However, Article 37 of the CRC states that detention of children
should be a measure of last resort and for the shortest period possible.179
Additionally, children should have access to facilities that provide health and
human dignity.180 The limited use of detention is emphasized due to the negative
effects that detention has on children and their development. Detention of
children leads to an increased chance of exposure to violence, stigmatization, and
an overall negative effect on wellbeing.181
If and when child detention must occur, “the conditions of detention and
the treatment of the child must be respectful of the dignity and special needs of
the child . . . .”182 The squalid conditions of al-Hol camp,183 combined with the
international outcry regarding the humanitarian crisis these children face,184
demonstrate that the children are not being treated with dignity and respect at the
camp. Additionally, “not all children de jure can be considered to have the capacity
to commit crimes.”185 There is not a presumption of guilt that applies to these
children as a population. There is also “no requirement under the universal
counter-terrorism instruments to criminalize association with or membership in a
terrorist group.”186 The detention of children at al-Hol camp for over one year
now violates the international norms delineating the correct way to detain them,
and this is a situation which must be remedied.

176
177
178

179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186

See id.
U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, supra note 43, at 97.
Carolyn Hamilton et al., Administrative Detention of Children: A Global Report 24 (UNICEF Child
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CRC, supra note 26, at art. 37(b).
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Although international law allows punishment only after an individual is
deemed guilty at trial,187 according to Syria, its detention camps do not serve as
punishment. Instead, the camps are a used as a way to incapacitate a person who
is a threat to national security.188 However, under international law, “preventing
[families] from leaving the camps” qualifies as “collective punishment,” which
“violates the laws of war.”189
Additionally, international law violations are occurring because restriction
must be “nondiscriminatory, proportionate, and necessary to achieve legitimate
aims.”190 Restriction has been discriminatory given the worse conditions that the
foreign detainees experience compared to Iraqi and Syrian detainees.191 Restriction
has not been proportionate because this detention is indefinite and has continued
for more than a year.192 Lastly, restriction does not achieve legitimate aims because
there are no pending trials against the detainees at the moment. The Kurdish
administration has already stated they will not prosecute detainees,193 and there are
currently no criminal charges being brought against the detainees by their own
nations. Detainees are simply being held because Syria cannot return them to their
home countries, and this violates international law. The U.N. Human Rights
Committee has clearly stated that detention “not in contemplation of prosecution
on a criminal charge . . . presents severe risks of arbitrary deprivation of liberty,”
especially if there are alternative measures to detention.194
A recent report also demonstrates that the Iraqi and the Kurdish
administrations have prosecuted over 180 children linked to ISIS, with the
possibility of torture being used to force confessions.195 However, at least at alHol camp, the Kurdish administration has stated that it does not intend to
prosecute the foreign children.196 Thus, children are being held indefinitely
without an option for future trials. Although it is outside the scope of this
Comment to determine whether these prosecutions would be lawful, the reality is
187

See ICCPR, supra note 107, at arts. 14, 16.
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See Hakimi, supra note 172, at 373.
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See Yee, Thousands of ISIS Children Suffer, supra note 36; Louisa Loveluck, A Desperate Struggle for
Survival Inside the Last Corner of the Islamic State, WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2019), http://perma.cc/F3MT8SHD.
See Dire Conditions for ISIS Suspects’ Families, supra note 11; Yee, Guns, Filth and ISIS, supra note 48.
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that regardless of whether the law of armed conflict or international human rights
covers this specific instance of detention, at least some of the children of ISIS,
who are to be regarded as victims according to the U.N., are being detained
without causing a threat to national security. Young orphans who have not been
indoctrinated are not a threat to national security. Children who were born into
the regime are not automatically ISIS fighters. Detaining children for no reason
but political stigma violates both the law of armed conflict and international
human rights law. The detention of children demonstrates a state overreach and
the sacrifice of children’s rights in favor of illegitimate national security goals.

C. Stateless Persons Law/Right to Nationality
The international community views stateless persons as “some of the most
vulnerable and oppressed people in the world.”197 The right to a nationality is a
basic human right guaranteed to all under the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR),198 the ICCPR,199 and the CRC.200 Furthermore, the 1954
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons201 and the 1961 Convention
on the Reduction of Statelessness202 expounds rights for stateless people and seeks
to limit state practices that leave someone stateless (for example, stripping
citizenship from someone who is not a dual citizen).
A person is de jure stateless “if he or she is not considered to be a national
by any State.”203 If a country formally strips citizenship from the detainees at alHol camp, and they do not have citizenship somewhere else, they would be de
jure stateless. However, detainees can be de facto stateless as well. This
designation covers “individuals who technically possess a nationality but are
unable to enjoy its benefits because . . . the State of their nationality is not able or
willing to offer them protection.”204 A majority of the foreign children at al-Hol
camp are de facto stateless because even though their citizenship has not been
stripped by their home country, most home countries are actively preventing their
197
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199

200
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return or turning a blind eye towards them. The 1961 Statelessness Convention—
which has seventy-four parties including Belgium, the U.K., the Netherlands, and
Germany—recommends that “persons who are stateless de facto should as far as
possible be treated as stateless de jure to enable them to acquire an effective
nationality.”205
While authority to make decisions about a person’s nationality primarily rest
with domestic governments, according to the U.N. Office of the High
Commissioner, “the right of States to decide who their nationals are is not
absolute . . . and must comply with their human rights obligations.”206 Specifically,
Article 15 of the UDHR prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of nationality.207
Additionally, the “prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality has been
widely recognized as a norm of customary international law.”208 Arbitrary
deprivations can take many different forms, including when states deprive
citizenship and by doing so “do not serve a legitimate state purpose or are
procedurally unfair.”209 Many states currently argue that national security trumps
the children of ISIS’s right to nationality, and thus the de facto statelessness of
their children serves a legitimate state purpose. However, this justification cannot
be squared with international human rights law, which treats the children of ISIS
as victims rather than terrorists.210 Because there is no legitimate purpose for
western governments to prevent victimized children from exercising their right to
nationality, states are violating international law by leaving their children in camps.
For adults, certain behavior might justify depriving someone of nationality. This
is beyond the scope of this Comment. However, there is no such equivalent
exception for the foreign children at al-Hol camp because they are treated as
victims under international law. Because the international community has
emphasized that states should do all they can to prevent statelessness211 or to
refrain from depriving their citizens of a nationality, the de facto statelessness of
205

206

207
208

209
210

211
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the children of al-Hol camp violates the CRC, the ICCPR, and the 1961
Statelessness Convention.

D. Repatriation
Repatriation, or the right to return, is embodied in several major
international declarations, treaties, and conventions, such as in Article 13 of the
UDHR, Article 12 of the ICCPR, and the 1951 Refugee Convention. The right to
return is both embodied in the preceding hard law (for example, binding treaties)
but also “soft law,” such as U.N. Resolutions.212 The U.N. Human Rights
Committee has also stated that governments “must not, by stripping a person of
nationality . . . arbitrarily prevent this person from returning to his or her own
country.”213 The U.N. Human Rights Committee adds that “there are few, if any,
circumstances in which deprivation of the right to enter one’s own country could
be reasonable.”214 Repatriation is also recognized under international customary
law: “[m]any commentators conclude that aside from being required by specific
provisions in international treaties, the right to return is obligatory under
customary international law in the human rights context.”215 The right to return is
a principle that ensures refugees and exiles a right of return to their home
countries. The right to return is a legally binding obligation on governments. In
fact, individuals are the only ones who control the decision not to return.216
Applying this principle to the situation of the foreigners at al-Hol camp, all
countries are legally obliged to allow their citizens to return home if they so wish.
Even though some citizens may, in fact, be linked to ISIS, there are binding
U.N. Security Council Resolutions217 that require states to bring terrorists to justice
and to “develop and implement appropriate prosecution, rehabilitation, and
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reintegration strategies for returning foreign terrorist fighters.”218 If detainees are
guilty of some crime, rather than leaving them in camps, steps should be taken
towards prosecution. Repatriation does not imply that one’s crimes should be
pardoned, nor does it provide an avenue towards impunity. Repatriation simply
allows detainees to return to their home country and face the consequences of
their actions abroad in their own judicial system.
Regarding children, Articles 7 and 8 of the CRC address their right to return.
Article 7 states that every child has a right to nationality and that “State Parties
shall ensure the implementation of [this] right . . . in particular where the child
would otherwise be stateless.”219 Article 8 emphasizes that when a child is illegally
deprived of his identity, states “shall provide appropriate assistance and
protection, with a view to re-establishing speedily his or her identity.”220 Like any
adult under international law, children at al-Hol camp have a right to return to
their countries of nationality, and the international framework’s heightened duties
towards children protect this specific right. The duty to protect the right to
nationality is not being accomplished by states with citizens at al-Hol camp,
especially with respect to speediness, because many children have been detained
for over one year.
Overall, international law grants every person the right to return to their
country and specifically requires countries to fulfill a child’s right to acquire a
nationality.221 This duty extends to children born abroad so they do not become
stateless.222 A right of return does not exist if there is no practical ability to return,
which is what the children and women are experiencing in al-Hol camp.
Theoretically, repatriation would end the humanitarian crisis for foreign children
at al-Hol camp because children would be taken out of detention and returned to
their countries of nationality. However, because states have been so slow at
repatriating children, it is hard to rely on this option to end the humanitarian crisis
of the children of ISIS. Thus, the following Section will propose a novel solution
to the humanitarian crisis at al-Hol camp: the children of ISIS could qualify for
asylum under international refugee law.
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IV. P ROPOSED S OLUTION : C HILD P ROTECTION U NDER
R EFUGEE L AW
This Section focuses on international refugee law, which is primarily covered
by the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. After discussing
international refugee law and the protection it grants to refugees, this Section
argues that foreign children at al-Hol camp qualify as refugees under the 1951
Refugee Convention when their countries refuse to repatriate them. Specifically,
this Comment argues that the children at al-Hol camp meet the requirements for
asylum because they are being persecuted as a particular social group (defined as
“children who lived in the ISIS regime and who do not have the ability to be
repatriated to their home country”). The persecution is carried out by first, their
home countries who refuse to repatriate them, and second, the Syrian government
and Kurdish administration. This means that asylum eligibility occurs not only
when a home country strips children’s citizenship but when a home country
actively decides to block the return of its children. Even though repatriation is the
preferred and least complicated solution to the humanitarian crisis at al-Hol camp,
the refusal to repatriate, along with the human-rights-violating treatment in the
detention camp, entitles the children at al-Hol camp to refugee status.

A. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and
its 1967 Protocol
The most important international treaty regarding refugee protection is the
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. This Convention defines the
term “refugee,” establishes the right to non-refoulement,223 and addresses
government responsibilities towards the protection of refugees. The Convention’s
1967 Protocol is foundational to refugee rights as well because it removes the
temporal and geographic limitations present in the 1951 Refugee Convention.
When states ratify both the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol, they
commit to upholding refugee rights. Even if states just ratify the 1967 Protocol
on its own, they still commit to refugee rights but without the original time and
geographic limitations present in the original 1951 Refugee Convention.224 As of
2015, 145 countries were parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention, 146 to the
Protocol, and 142 to both the Convention and the Protocol.225 Regional
223

224

225

U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 43, at 130 (“The non-refoulement principle entails
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mechanisms also exist that provide various refugee protections in different parts
of the world. These include the 1969 Organisation of African Unity Convention
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the 1984
Cartagena Declaration. However, for the purpose of this Comment, the focus is
on the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol, as these two documents
serve as the international framework that binds over 140 countries in the
international community to protect refugees around the world.
Syria is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention nor the 1967
Protocol. However, this is irrelevant to determining refugee status. The 1951
Refugee Convention sets obligations for countries to determine refugee status and
to provide protection if it is feasible, but not being a signatory does not deprive
refugees of a status determination if they are present in a non-signatory country.
In non-signatory countries, UNHCR often conducts Refugee Status
Determination through its mandate “to address protection gaps.”226
International human rights law, international humanitarian law, and
international criminal law also provide complementary protection to refugees
worldwide. Relevant treaties include the UDHR (“all human beings are born free
and equal in dignity and rights”),227 the Convention Against Torture (prohibiting
refoulement in an absolute manner),228 the CRC (emphasizing the principle of
non-discrimination, the principle of the best interest of the child, the right to be
heard, and the right to life and survival and development),229 the ICCPR (the right
to life, the right to liberty and security of a person, the right to liberty of
movement),230 the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights (the right to an adequate standard of living, the right to health, the right to
free education),231 and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (guaranteeing the right to non-discrimination
based on gender or sex).232
Additionally, even though states are obligated to uphold the rights of all
refugees, states have additional responsibilities toward refugee children. This
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obligation stems from the CRC itself.233 UNHCR’s Executive Committee
Conclusion No. 107 emphasizes the importance of protecting the fundamental
rights of children and recommends various steps to uphold these rights. These
recommendations include: “establishing and implementing procedures to
determine [refugee] children’s best interests, ensuring that children can enjoy their
rights without discrimination, providing and monitoring alternative care and
accommodation arrangements for unaccompanied and separated children, and
supporting durable solutions for children.”234 While not binding, UNHCR
strongly recommends states to treat foreign refugee children within their
jurisdiction in a way that upholds these international protections.
The definition of a refugee is provided by the 1951 Refugee Convention.
According to the Convention, a refugee is “someone who is unable or unwilling
to return to their country of origin, owing to a well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group, or political opinion.”235 It is important to note that internally
displaced persons (IDPs), meaning those who have not crossed an international
border, do not meet the definition of refugees.236
Being stateless does not immediately qualify someone as a refugee. Article
1(A)2 of the Convention makes a distinction between refugees with a nationality
and those that are stateless. For refugees with a nationality, they should be “unable
or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of their State of nationality,”237
while the latter “not having a nationality and being outside the country of his
former habitual residence” should be “unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to
return [to their State of former residence].”238 However, the most generally
accepted view by courts worldwide is that “no substantial difference is intended
between the stateless and other refugees, and that the Convention aims to provide
protection to a person, whether outside their country of nationality, or, not having
a nationality and outside their country of former habitual residence, who has a
well-founded fear of being persecuted on Convention grounds.”239
The fact that the 1951 Refugee Convention differentiates the standard for
refugees and stateless people is extremely significant to this Comment’s argument.
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Both stateless people and those with a nationality have the right to qualify as
refugees under the 1951 Refugee Convention.240 Thus, the refugee definition does
not necessarily dictate that persecution must come from actors within a country
of origin. If this were a requirement, stateless people could never qualify as
refugees because they would by definition not reside in their country of origin.
For stateless people, a well-founded fear of persecution (linked to any of the five
convention grounds) is what must be present, no matter if it is in the state of
nationality or if it is in the state where the stateless person is residing. For the
children at al-Hol camp, who are de facto stateless, one of the two types of
persecution they face is not in their home country but rather at the hands of their
home country. This will be discussed at length in Section IV.B.3, but it is
important to note that this differentiation of the source of persecution does not
disqualify the children at al-Hol camp from refugee status under international law.
In conclusion, the 1951 Refugee Convention does not disadvantage stateless
people from becoming refugees just because they do not have a nationality.

B. Applying International Refugee Law to the Children at alHol Camp
The foreign children at al-Hol camp are unable to return to their country of
origin. Their country of origin is not Syria—assuming that they came to Syria from
abroad or that that they are entitled to their parent’s citizenship even if born into
the ISIS regime. Unfortunately, there is no publicly available data that explains
how many of these children were brought into ISIS or were born under ISIS. The
following analysis of the key elements of the refugee definition will demonstrate
that these children have a well-founded fear of persecution on account of their
being members of a particular social group, specifically “children who lived in the
ISIS regime and who do not have the ability to be repatriated to their home
country.”241 Because they meet the definition of a refugee, foreign children in alHol camp qualify as refugees under international law when their home country
actively prevents them from coming back into their country. This argument does

240
241

See 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 24, at art. 1(A)(2).
UNHCR defines “particular social group” as:
a group of persons who share a common characteristic other than their risk of
being persecuted, or who are perceived as a group by society. The characteristic
will often be one which is innate, unchangeable, or which is otherwise
fundamental to identity, conscience or the exercise of one’s human rights.
UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: “Membership of a Particular Social Group” Within the Context
of Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (May 7,
2002). Even though there is no inclusive list of what groups constitute particular social group,
“children who lived in the ISIS regime and who do not have the ability to be repatriated to their
home country” seeks to meet both the immutability requirement and the perception requirement
of the UNHCR definition.
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not mean to imply that countries are entitled to render children effectively stateless
nor that this solution is the most appropriate for the current humanitarian crisis.
However, when countries violate their duty of repatriation towards their children,
leaving them no practical path to return, the international community may
consider refugee designation for children, when it is in the children’s best interest
to do so. Such action could end the human rights violations occurring at al-Hol
camp and give displaced children the opportunity to integrate into a new society.
Though, refugee designation is considered a method of last resort given the
challenging diplomacy issue of determining which countries will take children and
how many, the unacceptable alternative is to allow vulnerable children to be
sacrificed in the name of political stigmas.

1. The refugee definition: outside his or her country of origin
To qualify for refugee status, the claimant (in this case, the child) must be
residing outside his or her country of origin. However, the Convention “requires
neither that the putative refugee shall have fled by reason of fear of persecution,
nor that persecution should have actually occurred.”242 The foreign children at alHol camp clearly meet this standard. Assuming they were either born abroad and
brought into ISIS, or that they were born into ISIS but are entitled to their parent’s
nationality, the children at al-Hol camp are not in their country of origin. They are
located in Syria, which is where they would make their claim of asylum, even if
Syria does not have the capabilities to provide safe refuge for these children.
Although Syria’s inability to serve as an adequate asylum provider is outside the
scope of this Comment, in such a case, third-country resettlement can be done by
UNHCR, allowing refugees to avail themselves of the protection he or she is
entitled to have.

2. The refugee definition: well-founded fear
To demonstrate a well-founded fear, asylum seekers must demonstrate that
“there is a reasonable possibility that they will suffer persecution if returned to
their home country of nationality or habitual residence.”243 There is an objective
and subjective standard to this definition. The objective standard assesses whether
the fear of persecution can be corroborated by available conditions in the state.
This can take the form of country conditions reports, for example. The subjective
standard assesses whether refugees can demonstrate that they are experiencing
“an extreme form of anxiety that is neither feigned nor overstated.”244
242
243
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GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 237, at 63.
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Objective criteria for a well-founded fear in the situation at hand comes from
two sources because the children at al-Hol camp are facing persecution245 from
two different actors. First, the children are being persecuted by their own home
countries because they are not willing to take the children back. Home countries’
failure to withdraw their children from the mistreatment at al-Hol camp
constitutes the persecution. Press releases from those countries—especially those
that have proposed stripping citizenship from children—and reports and
newspaper articles that demonstrate the lack of response to this situation fulfill
the objective criteria for persecution. Additionally, the children are being
persecuted by the Kurdish local administration, which is violating international
law by detaining them indefinitely, without fair trials, and without access to basic
resources. Furthermore, the fact that foreign children in al-Hol camp are subject
to disparate and discriminatory treatment compared to their Iraqi and Syrian
counterparts provides more evidence that they are the subjects of persecution.
Such treatment violates the principle of non-discrimination. Regarding the
children’s fear of Kurdish persecution, the countless reports by human rights
organizations, civil society, and news outlets detailing the conditions in al-Hol
camp fulfills the objective element of a well-founded fear. The articles themselves
present the external circumstances that satisfy the requirement.
The subjective criteria for a well-founded fear is hard to quantify, and “it is
by no means clear . . . from the definition, jurisprudence or commentary, how
much of a role the subjective element is expected to play in a determination
process.”246 Additionally, this criterion is much more individualized than the
objective criteria explained above. However, it is reasonable to assume that
children who do not have access to an adequate living standard, experience
violence , see that they are treated worse than others in the camp, and realize they
are no longer wanted by their home countries would demonstrate a subjective fear
of persecution. Because both the objective and subjective criteria can likely be met
by the actions of the Kurdish administration and the home country’s refusal to
allow children to return, the children of ISIS are experiencing a well-founded fear.

3. The refugee definition: persecution
Persecution is not specifically defined in the 1951 Refugee Convention nor
the 1967 Protocol. Persecution may amount to actions by the state itself, but also
by non-state agents, like “armed groups . . . family members . . . or the general
population, where the State is unable or unwilling to provide protection.”247 In an
attempt to provide guidance, the Council of the E.U. included a non-exhaustive
245
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Persecution will be discussed in the following Section. This Subsection solely focuses on
establishing a well-founded fear.
GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 237, at 64.
UNHCR & Inter-Parliamentary Union, supra note 135, at 132.
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list in the Qualification Directive of acts that can be considered persecution. E.U.
law matters in this case because most of the states that are refusing to allow
children back into their countries are in Western Europe. Though some children
have home countries outside the E.U., this list serves as a guide that demonstrates
the flexibility and scope of the definition of persecution. The Council of the E.U.’s
guiding list includes:
acts of physical or mental violence, including acts of sexual violence; legal,
administrative, police, and/or judicial measures which are in themselves
discriminatory or which are implemented in a discriminatory manner;
prosecution or punishment, which is disproportionate or discriminatory;
denial of judicial redress resulting in a disproportionate or discriminatory
punishment; prosecution or punishment for refusal to perform military
service in a conflict, where performing military service would include crimes
or acts falling under the exclusion clauses as set out in Article 12(2); acts of a
gender-specific or child-specific nature.248

The definition of persecution is meant to be flexible “given the duty under the
1967 Protocol to apply the refugee definition in a manner that ensures its
relevance to ‘new refugee situations.’”249 The modern understanding of this
definition regards persecution as “the sustained or systemic denial of basic human
rights demonstrative of a failure of state protection.”250
The children of ISIS are facing persecution from two actors: their own home
countries and the Kurdish administration/Syrian government. First, the fact that
home countries are rendering children effectively stateless amounts to persecutory
harm in this case. Generally, being stateless does not automatically give rise to
refugee status, but in this case, it puts children at a higher risk of persecution.
When looking at the Convention’s history, “the intention of the drafters [of the
Convention] was . . . to restrict refugee recognition to situations in which there
was the risk of a type of injury inconsistent with the willingness and ability of a
state to protect its own population.”251 The case of actively blocking the return of
children to their home country is compelling evidence for denial of protection.
Even though the existence of a risk of serious injury alone does not suffice as
persecution as defined by the Convention, it raises to the level of a “being
persecuted” when “the risk has an unrelenting or inescapable character because
there is no domestic remedy.”252 The children at al-Hol camp meet this standard
because they are unable to leave the camps (“unrelenting or inescapable
character”) and because their countries refuse to take them back, with some even
248
249
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threatening to strip them of their citizenship. When citizens are unable to avail
themselves of the same protections that other nationals of a country are entitled
to, refugee law acts as a substitution for protection.253
Second, even if the home countries’ failure to repatriate their children does
not constitute persecution, the Kurdish administration—by implementing
unlawful administrative detention centers in a discriminatory manner—is
persecuting the children. In this case, the Syrian government is unwilling to protect
the detainees from the Kurdish administration at al-Hol and other camps, all of
which serve to unlawfully punish children for their affiliation with ISIS and deny
them judicial redress. Because the Syrian government is allowing the Kurdish
administration to treat children like this, foreign children in al-Hol camp are facing
persecution from the Syrian government and a non-state agent (the Kurdish
administration).
According to refugee law experts, for detention to be deemed legal and thus
non-persecutory under international law, three benchmarks must all be met: the
detention must be lawful, not arbitrary, and conducted in a manner that respects
the dignity and human rights of the detainees.254 The first benchmark determines
whether detention is “on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as
are established by law.”255 This Comment has established that the al-Hol camp
violates international law regarding universal detention standards, thus making it
unlawful. Additionally, refugee experts explain that “persons facing arrest or
detention at the hand of non-state actors will almost always face the risk of
persecutory harm.”256 In this case, the first benchmark is not met because the
children of ISIS are being unlawfully detained by the Kurdish administration, a
non-state actor. Second, even if the first benchmark is met, detention cannot be
arbitrary or discriminatory. Arbitrary detention includes “the detention of
innocent family members of alleged criminals,” which is exactly what is occurring
at al-Hol camp.257 Detention of the foreign children at al-Hol camp is also
discriminatory because they are treated considerably worse than the rest of Iraqi
and Syrian children.258 Children in the annex receive less humanitarian aid and
have restricted access to markets, hospitals, and food centers compared to Syrian
and Iraqi detainees.259 Thus, the second benchmark is also not met. Third, even if
253
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detention is lawful and not arbitrary, detention must also be done in a way that
respects the dignity and human rights of the person.260 The international coverage
that focuses on al-Hol camp highlights the dire humanitarian crises present at the
camps, demonstrating that al-Hol camp fails to meet this third requirement.
Failing this three-part test, the detention by the Kurdish administration amounts
to persecution.

4. The refugee definition: on account of race, religion, nationality,
political opinion, and membership in a particular social group
The “on account of” requirement maintains that there must be a legal nexus
between the five grounds listed in the refugee definition and the persecution. The
relevant category of asylum in the case of the children at al-Hol camp is
“membership in a particular social group.” Because so many different kinds if
children are being mistreated by the Kurdish administration and are being ignored
by their home countries, it is impossible to make a claim that they are being
persecuted due to a specific race, religion, nationality, or political opinion. Rather,
the reason these children are being persecuted is because they are perceived as
part of a particular social group which this Comment terms “children who lived
in the ISIS regime and who do not have the ability to be repatriated to their home
country.”261
There is no set definition by the international community on what it means
to be a member of particular social group. However, relevant courts have
interpreted “particular social group” to mean groups of persons that either (1)
share a common immutable characteristic, “something innate to their being or so
fundamental to their being that they cannot be expected to change it” or (2) “have
a distinct identity within their country . . . because they are perceived as being
different by that society.”262 The first requirement is described as the immutable
characteristic test and the second is the social perception test.263 Courts vary on
whether one or both tests must be satisfied.264 UNHCR recommends that one
standard or the other should be met.265
Regarding the immutable characteristic test, former status or association—
such as a status of a former child soldier—is enough to fulfill the innate
260
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characteristic test because “history or experience is not within a person’s current
power to change.”266 It is controversial whether association with criminal groups,
such as gangs, or in this case, ISIS, is enough to meet the immutability
requirement. However, “where a person is at risk of being persecuted on the basis
of his or her former membership in such an entity,” especially when he or she was
forced to join, then the claim “ought logically to be included within the ambit of
social group because former status is immutable.”267 Many of the children at alHol camp did not have a choice but to move with their parents when they chose
to join ISIS, and many were born into ISIS without having the ability to choose
what to be born into. These types of children had no agency when choosing to be
associated with ISIS, thus their ISIS affiliation is an immutable characteristic.
Additionally, even those who joined ISIS on their own may qualify as a refugee so
as long as they have renounced membership in ISIS (provided they do not meet
the requirements of Article 1(F) described below). As two experts on the law of
refugee studies state:
the non-discrimination norms that underpin the nexus clause supports the
inclusion of groups based on former status within the social group ground,
notwithstanding some element of undesirability . . . . As abhorrent as a
person’s behavior may appear, if their immutable or protected status will give
rise to a risk of being persecuted . . . refugee status cannot be denied based
on subjective ideas of merit.268

Although many scholars advocate for the renunciation of the social
perception test due to its ambiguity, 269 the children of ISIS easily fall within its
definition as well. For the social perception test, it must be demonstrated that the
children of ISIS are a “group within society which is faced with persecution within
the social context of that very society.”270 The children of ISIS are a distinct group
within Syria and within their respective host countries. The detention of these
children in camps makes the separation physically clear, demonstrating that this
test can be met. Additionally, the physical separation of the children of ISIS from
society constitutes persecution.
Case law from the U.S. and elsewhere demonstrates that particular social
groups can be extremely specific. For example, the U.S. Board of Immigration
Appeals admitted that “young women who were members of the TchambaKunsuntu Tribe of northern Togo who had not been subjected to female genital
mutilation, as practiced by the tribe, and who opposed the practice” were a
266
267
268
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particular social group.271 Additionally, the High Court of Australia also
recognized “those who have only one child [and who] do not accept the
limitations placed on them or who are coerced or forced into being sterilized,” as
a discrete social group.272 These examples demonstrate that the social group
description for children of ISIS, “children who lived in the ISIS regime and who
do not have the ability to be repatriated to their home country,” should not be
deemed as too specific to constitute a particular social group.

5. Article 1(F) Exceptions
Even though this Comment has established that the foreign children at alHol camp qualify for refugees status under the 1951 Refugee Convention, the
Convention also states that refugee status can be denied when a person has
committed a terrorist-related crime.273 Article 1(F) states that the Refugee
Convention:
shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons
for considering that: (a) he/she committed a crime against peace, a war crime,
or a crime against humanity . . . (b) he/she has committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the country of refuge . . . (c) he/she has been guilty of
acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the U.N.274

While some of the children, especially those who were directly involved with
ISIS, may fall under this article, there are exceptions for acts committed when the
applicant was a child and for former combatants. For the Article 1(F) exception
to apply to children, he/she must have reached the age of criminal
responsibility,275 which is determined by each country, and it must be established
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that he/she had the mental capacity276 to commit the crimes.277 According to
UNHCR, “[t]he younger the child, the greater is the presumption that he/she did
not have the necessary mental capacity at the time.”278 This mental capacity
threshold is hard to meet for minors because the international community is
supposed to treat children who were part of former terrorist organizations as
victims rather than perpetrators.
Concerning former combatants, those “who request asylum should be
admitted to [asylum procedures] once it has been established that they have
genuinely and permanently renounced military activities.”279 This determination
would take place at an individual Refugee Status Determination. Furthermore,
“[t]he fact of having taken part in armed conflict does not in and of itself
constitute a ground for exclusion, nor does it as such establish a presumption of
responsibility for acts within the scope of an exclusion clause . . . .”280 Article 1(F)
will not apply for many children in al-Hol camp since they were not even part of
the conflict or were too young to actively participate in ISIS. However, for those
children at al-Hol camp that may be subject to Article 1(F), it must be
demonstrated that they committed crimes above the age of criminal responsibility
with the mental capacity to do so for the exception to apply. Plus, if they were
actual child soldiers, the fact that they have renounced ISIS permanently could
still provide them refugee status. Furthermore, it is unclear if any children at alHol would need to establish that they do not qualify for the Article 1(F) exception
in order to gain refugee status; journalists so far have been able to find various
women at al-Hol camp who are strict ISIS followers, but no mention of children
pledging allegiance to ISIS has occurred to date.
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6. Article 33(2) Exception
This Comment has demonstrated that most of the foreign children at al-Hol
detention will qualify for refugee status even when considering under the Article
1(F) exception. While this Comment does not discuss the logistics behind thirdcountry resettlement, it is important to note that Article 33 allows a state to “divest
itself of protection obligations to even a recognized refugee where critical issues
of safety and security are demonstrated.”281 Even though states may claim that it
is dangerous for them to take in refugee children who were associated with ISIS,
this claim is insufficient when it is executed by a blanket policy that denies all of
the detained children the right to asylum. By denying individual assessments of
children’s situations, state security interests fail when balanced against the
international duty to uphold children’s rights. That is to say, where it has not been
demonstratively proven that a child poses a danger to the security of the country,
the refugee must be granted asylum. If children are not charged as terrorists
through a fair trial and final judgment, they must be presumed as victims who are
entitled to international protection as refugees.

C. Family Separation
Granting the children of ISIS refugee status may create its own negative
externalities, one being the separation of children from their families.282 In Article
9, the CRC specifically addresses a child’s right not to be separated from his or
her parents against their will. However, a child may be separated from his or her
parents when it is in the child’s best interests. Critics of this Comment’s argument
could claim that without considering the mother’s legal status, the re-location of
a child as a refugee to a third country could potentially separate an innocent child
from an innocent mother. This would technically violate the CRC. However, one
could argue that this family separation is in the best interest of the child because
even if the mother is not an ISIS follower, the squalid conditions at the camp are
putting the child’s life at risk. This argument might be regarded as weak because
it could imply that any time a child and a mother are detained for an indefinite
time, family separation would be a lawful option to protect the child.
A stronger and more nuanced response to this critique finds its legal basis in
Articles 20 and 22 of the CRC. These articles address the right to “special
protection and assistance” by the state if “a child is temporarily or permanently
deprived of his or her family environment, or in whose own best interests cannot
281
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be allowed to remain in that environment.”283 This Comment has established that
the conditions at al-Hol camp are against the best interest of the child, especially
due to the severe health risks, the lack of education, and the constant exposure to
avid ISIS followers, even if this does not include their mother. Article 20 of the
CRC allows alternative care for children including “foster placement, kafalah of
Islamic law, adoption, or if necessary, placement in suitable institutions for the
care of children.”284 This implies that states are allowed to find alternate solutions
of care when a child’s present environment is not conducive to a child’s best
interest. Furthermore, Article 22 mandates states with refugee children to trace
the child’s parents or any family members that may be found.285 While this
Comment does not describe the logistical ramifications of granting al-Hol camp
children refugee status, the CRC provides a helpful avenue once a child receives
status. Every state in the world except the U.S. is required under the CRC to
attempt family reunification for refugee children (covered under Article 10). Thus,
refugee designation would be a way for children to leave al-Hol camp, with states
seeking to reunify the child with other family members if available.

V. C ONCLUSION
After the territorial defeat of ISIS on March 23, 2019, thousands of women
and children who were associated with ISIS were detained at various camps in
Syria because of their perceived link to the terrorist organization. The conditions
at al-Hol camp, the largest of the detention camps, have led to international outcry
due to the humanitarian crisis experienced by the detainees.286 There is an overall
lack of food, water, medicine, and other basic resources.
The Kurdish administration has stated that it has no intention to prosecute
the detainees, and it has repeatedly asked detainees’ home countries to repatriate
their citizens.287 However, most western countries have either repatriated only a
few of the detainees or outright denied repatriating them due to national security
concerns. Because repatriation numbers have been low, and because prosecution
in Iraq or in the detainees’ home countries is unlikely to meet the children of ISIS’s
needs under international standards, thousands of children have nowhere to go
and are detained indefinitely.
This Comment focused on the foreign children at al-Hol camp and proposed
a novel solution to end their detention. Specifically, this Comment argued that the
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de facto stateless children at al-Hol camp are eligible for asylum under
international law.288 Being eligible for asylum is an alternate way for children to
gain residency in a foreign country and to end child detention in these camps.
After analyzing relevant international law, this Comment found that
indefinitely detaining children solely because of a perceived link to ISIS violates
both the law of armed conflict and international human rights law. The detention
of children demonstrates a state overreach and the sacrifice of children’s rights in
favor of illegitimate national security goals. Furthermore, because countries are
purposefully preventing their detained citizens from returning to their country of
origin, the children of ISIS are being prevented from exercising their right to
nationality289 and their right to return.290 Thus, the lack of repatriation is leaving
the foreign children at al-Hol camp de facto stateless.
Because the 1951 Refugee Convention grants protection to people who have
a nationality and to the stateless, the children of ISIS are eligible for asylum under
international law when their home countries refuse to repatriate them. Specifically,
these children meet the requirements for asylum because they are being persecuted
as a particular social group (defined as “children who lived in the ISIS regime and
who do not have the ability to be repatriated to their home country”). The
persecution is carried out first, by their home countries who refuse to repatriate
them, and second, by the Syrian government and the Kurdish administration. The
fact that children may have been associated with ISIS does not automatically
disqualify them from refugee status because of the international norm to treat
children involved in armed conflict as victims. However, if a rare case occurs
where there is clear evidence that a child can be charged with a terrorist related
crime, then this child could potentially be disqualified from refugee designation.291
Even though family separation might seem like a shortcoming of the
proposed solution, the CRC specifically allows for states to find alternate care
when a child’s environment is not conducive to the best interest of the child.292
Al-Hol camp’s uninhabitable conditions, the lack of education, the constant
exposure to extremist views, and the indefinite aspect of detention all demonstrate
that children’s best interests are not being met at the camp. However, in order to
prevent family separation, the CRC mandates that states must try to reunify
children with other family members if they are relocated or separated from their
parents.293 Thus, qualifying as a refugee would be a way for children to be able to
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leave al-Hol, and the CRC would require states to promote family reunification
once a child is no longer detained.
This Comment’s purpose was to propose an alternate solution to the
problems presented by al-Hol camp, which is acting as an illegal collective
punishment for children who are associated with ISIS. By granting refugee status
to those children who qualify under international standards, children will have a
way to gain residency in another country and to escape indefinite detention in
squalid conditions.
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